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Hellerstein: Criminal Law Decisions

TIPTOEING THROUGH THE TULIPS: THE
SUPREME COURT'S MAJOR, BUT MODEST BY
COMPARISON, CRIMINAL LAW RULINGS
DURING THE 1994-95 TERM
Leon Lazer:
For those of you who may have some anxiety about how this
schedule is going to work out, our next speaker is going to speak
about the criminal law cases, and indeed, the Commerce Clause
case that I will mention in a moment that was dealt with by the
Supreme Court in the last term.
It is my pleasure now to introduce a speaker who has been with
us through the six annual conferences that preceded this one. He
is, in my view, one of the leading authorities on criminal law in
this country. I remember him very well as he was the Chief of
the Appeals Bureau of the Legal Aid Society in New York City
when I was a member of the appellate division. That appeals
bureau was the best that we heard and I am referring as
competitors to the Appeals Bureau of the District Attorney's
Office, the Attorney General, Corporation Counsel and the like.
He is now a professor at Brooklyn Law School.
On four occasions the New York State Nominating
Commission has sent his name to the governor as a prospective
appointee to the New York State Court of Appeals, and he does
not have that title, so the governor did not necessarily follow that
recommendation. The governor did not follow it as to me either.
And while Bill Hellerstein was sent up four times, I think Joseph
Sullivan underwent number five, and he never made it either, so
we have got a pretty good group up here.
It is my real pleasure now to introduce Professor Hellerstein
who will talk about the criminal law cases of the last term, and
also, the gun-free school zones case which is a Commerce Clause
case in relation to which Professor Hellerstein has some special
connection. And so it is my pleasure to introduce him to you
now.

267
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Professor William E. Hellerstein:*

Thank you, Judge Lazer.
INTRODUCTION

Oh my, was that not some term? As should be apparent to
anyone who has not been on leave from the American legal
system for the past year or comatose, the Supreme Court's 199495 term was one for the ages. Although the Court issued the
fewest number of opinions since the 1955 term, in no recent term
has it rendered as many foundation-shaking rulings as it did this
term. 1 The decisions on term limits, voting rights, desegregation,
affirmative action, separation of powers, freedom of speech and
religion, and the Commerce Clause contain the potential for
significant alteration of generally accepted constitutional
precepts. Not surprisingly, commentators opined that major sea
changes had taken place 2 and that the true "Reagan Court" had
finally arrived. 3
With one exception, the Commerce Clause decision in United
States v. Lopez, 4 the Court's criminal law decisions were

relatively modest. There were no major departures from settled
precedents. In three Fourth Amendment cases, the Court retained
its less than generous perspective as to the scope of the
amendment's protections. 5 In cases involving the Double
Jeopardy 6 and Ex Post Facto Clauses, 7 the Court also took a
restrictive view. But where the obligation of prosecutors to
*

Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Juris Doctor, Harvard Law

School (1962).

1. Linda Greenhouse, Farewell to the Old Order in the Court, N.Y.
TIMES, section 4, p.1, col.1, July 2, 1995.
2. Id.
3. Joan Biskupic, The Supreme Court Ronald Reagan Wanted Has
Arrived, WASH. POST WEEKLY, July 10-16, 1995, p. 3 1 .
4. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
5. See infra notes 89-185 and accompamying text.
6. See infra notes 186-215 and accompamying text.
7. See infra notes 216-266 and accompanmying text.
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disclose evidence that is material and favorable to the defense
was at issue, the Court stood firm on the defendant's side, as it
did on a number of habeas corpus issues. 8 The Court also
construed a number of federal criminal statutes, discussion of
which is largely beyond the scope of today's program.
I. CRIME AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Undoubtedly, the decision in United States v. Lopez9 is very
important. What is less than clear is why. Is Lopez the first step
in a broad assault by the Court on congressional power? Does it
jeopardize other federal criminal statutes enacted pursuant to the
commerce power? Does it cast doubt upon various aspects of the
Contract With America, such as congressionally enacted tort
reform and limits on punitive damages? Is it important because it
resurrects Commerce Clause10 concepts that, in the 1930's,
thwarted President Roosevelt's and Congress' ability to
ameliorate serious, nation-wide economic distress? Or does
Lopez's main significance lie in that it is a "process" decision,
one in which the Court, as a precondition for approval, has now
directed Congress to abide by specific legislative processes, such
as adequate hearings and sufficient findings of fact, when a
statute's legitimacy is not immediately apparent? Or, is there less
here than actually meets the eye?
Perhaps much turns on the meaning of "important." If it means
"significant," then it is important because not since Carter Coal
Company1 1 in 1935 has the Court declared a statute directed at
8. See infra notes 267-368 and accompamying text.
9. 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl. 3. This clause states that Congress has the
power "[tlo regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the
several states, and with the Indian Tribes." Id.

11. United States v. Carter Coal Company, 298 U.S. 238 (1935). In
Carter Coal, the Court held that the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935, 49 Stat. 991, which stated that the mining and distribution of coal was
so affected with a national public interest and so related to the general
welfare of the country that the industry should be regulated by controlling the
wages, hours and working conditions of the miners, was beyond the power of

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1996

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 [1996], Art. 5

270

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 12

12
private entities under the Commerce Clause unconstitutional.
If, on the other hand, "important" means "portentous," perhaps
it is less so. Let's see what the Court did and why.

Alfonso Lopez was a 12th-grade student at Edison High in San
Antonio, Texas who carried a concealed handgun into his
school. 13 He was charged with violating the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990,14 which prohibited "any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows... is a
school zone." 15 The district court denied his motion to dismiss

the indictment, finding that the statute was a constitutional
exercise of Congress's commerce power. 16 However, the Fifth
Circuit reversed because it believed that there had been

insufficient congressional findings and legislative history to
establish the relationship between the conduct prohibited and
interstate commerce. 17 The court of appeals' ruling is heavily a

"process" decision; it is a greater mystery whether the same is
true of the Supreme Court's decision.

Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion held the statute
unconstitutional because the conduct which it purported to
regulate, possession of a weapon within 1000 feet of school

Congress. Id. at 299. The Court concluded that the mining and
manufacturing of coal was not within the bounds of interstate commerce. Id.
at 299-300.
12. The only decision after 1935 to render a statute unconstitutional under
the Commerce Clause is National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), which held that Congress could not regulate the wages and hours
paid by states to their employees. But even that ruling was overruled nine
years later. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
13. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
14. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702,
104 Stat. 4844 (1990) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921, 922).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A). The term "school zone" is defined as "in,
or on the grounds of, a public, parochial or private school" or "within a
distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public, parochial or private
school." Id. § 921(a)(25).
16. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
17. Id.
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property, does not "substantially affect" interstate commerce. 18

He pointed out that, by its terms, the statute had nothing to do
with "commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, regardless
of how broadly those terms are defined. 19 Also, he explained, the

statute "is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic
activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless

the intrastate activity were regulated."20 Therefore, the statute
could not be sustained, he concluded, under those cases which

upheld the regulation of activities that arose out of or were
"connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the
aggregate, substantially affect[ed] interstate commerce."21 In

short, the aggregation principle of Wickard v. Filburn2 2 will not
cover it.
Lastly, Rehnquist said the statute did not contain a
jurisdictional element which, based on a case-by-case analysis,
would ensure that the firearms possession in question had the
requisite nexus to interstate commerce. 23 Consequently,
Rehnquist stated, to uphold the government's contention that the
statute is justified because firearms possession in a local school
zone does indeed substantially affect interstate commerce would
require the Court to "pile inference upon inference" in a manner

18. Id.at 1634.
19. Id.at 1630-31.
20. Id. at 1631.
21. Id.
22. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). In Wickard, the Court held that the amendments
to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which limited the amount of
wheat a farmer could keep for his own consumption, was a valid exercise of
the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Id. at 128-29. The
Court stated that:
[E]ven if appellee's activity be local and though it may be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce and this
irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time
have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect'.
Id. at 125.
23. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
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that would convert congressional Commerce Clause authority
24
into a general police power of the sort held only by the states.
The government faced two basic obstacles in its defense of the
statute: the absence of a meaningful legislative record and the
reductio ad absurdum quality of its own argument. Ostensibly
mindful of institutional constraints, Rehnquist acknowledged that
"[w]e agree with the Government that Congress normally is not
required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens
that an activity has on interstate commerce." '25 With that said,
however, the Chief Justice proceeded to condemn the
shortcomings of Congress's legislative process in this instance:
"But to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to
evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question
substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such
substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking
here. "

26

Most significant was the government's or the dissenters'
inability to offer a limiting principle to their argument. The
government argued that carrying a gun affected commerce
because guns may lead to crime and that will affect commerce.
However, the government conceded that under its theory,
"Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but all
activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how
tenuously they relate to interstate commerce." 27 Without a
limiting principle, the government's argument was a sitting duck
for Rehnquist's assertion that "it is difficult to perceive any
limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law

24. Id. at 1634.
25. Id. at 1631.

26. Id. at 1632. Although not relied upon by the government in this case,
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 amends §
922(q) to include the finding of Congress in regard to the effects that firearm
possession in school zones has on interstate and foreign commerce. Id. at
n.4; see Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320904, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
27. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss2/5

6

Hellerstein: Criminal Law Decisions

1996]

CRIMINAL LAW DECISIONS

enforcement or education where states historically have been
sovereign."28

Rehnquist conceded that broad language in the Court's modem
Commerce Clause cases had conferred upon Congress extremely
broad powers and even had suggested "the possibility of
additional expansion ... ."29 Nonetheless the Court, he stated,
"decline[s] here to proceed any further. To do so would require
us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does
30
not presuppose something not enumerated."
Some may read Lopez as evincing a major shift in Commerce
Clause adjudication - a return to the uncharitable view of
congressional power expressed by Court in the 1930's. Others
may view it less drastically but still conclude that the Court now
will subject Commerce Clause legislation to exceedingly close
scrutiny. Both of these readings may be premature.
The majority's opinion must be read in conjunction with Justice
Kennedy's concurrence, joined by Justice O'Connor. 3 1 In content
and tone they differ markedly. Kennedy emphasizes that "great
restraint" is called for "before the Court determines that the
[Commerce] Clause is insufficient to support an exercise of the
national power," 32 and that the "substantial element of political
judgment in Commerce Clause matters leaves our institutional
capacity to intervene more in doubt than when we decide cases,
for instance, under the Bill of Rights even though clear and
33
bright lines are often absent in the latter class of disputes."
Nonetheless, because the Framers did not give Congress
unlimited power the Court must, Kennedy concludes, maintain a
proper federal-state balance, and in this case, "[t]he statute
before us upsets the federal balance to a degree that renders it an
unconstitutional assertion of the commerce power, and our

28. Id.
29. Id. at 1634.

30. Id.
31. Id. at 1634-42.

32. Id. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 1640 (Kennedy, I., concurring).
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intervention is required." ' 34 Taken at face value, neither Justice
Kennedy nor Justice O'Connor appear ready to strike Congress'
commerce power in all but the most extreme instance.
Not so for Justice Thomas. His concurrence aspires wistfully to
the Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the "nine old men." Like
the majority of the early New Deal Court, Justice Thomas
believes, for example, that manufacture is not commerce and that
the Court was wrong to so conclude. 35 Only his grudging
acknowledgment that "many believe that it is too late in the day
to undertake a fundamental reexamination of the past 60
years," 36 and that "[c]onsideration of stare decisis and reliance
interests may convince us that we cannot wipe the slate clear," 37
appears to stand in his way.
Justice Breyer wrote the principal dissent in which Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined. 38 While he acknowledged
that judicial review of Commerce Clause-driven statutes is
appropriate, he defended, on institutional and practical grounds,
the deference which Congress has been accorded in modern
times. The Constitution, Breyer observed, "delegates the
commerce power directly to Congress," and the determination of
a "significant factual connection between the regulated activity
and interstate commerce ... requires an empirical judgment of a
kind that a legislature is more likely than a court to make with
accuracy." 39 That empirical judgment in enacting the Gun Free
School Zones Act, he concluded, was entirely rational because of
the extensive reports and other materials to which Congress had
access.40 From these materials, which he annexed to his opinion,
Congress could rationally find that "guns in schools significantly
undermine the quality of education in our Nation's classrooms,
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 1643 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1650 n.8 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1657.
Id. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer stated: "[flor one thing, reports, hearings, and other

readily available literature make clear that the problem of guns in and around
schools is widespread and extremely serious." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1659.
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[and that] Congress could also have found, given the effect of
education upon interstate and foreign commerce, that gun-related
violence in and around schools is a commercial, as well as a
human, problem."41

Perhaps the key weakness of the Breyer dissent is that it fails to
respond to the majority's call for a delimiting principle. Good
appellate lawyers know that when the Court asks for such a
principle, it is wise to provide one; dissenting justices, of course,
need not do so. However, Justice Breyer's choice to argue the
case on its facts, as he perceived them, might have been
strengthened by inclusion of a hypothesis in which Congress
conceivably would exceed its enumerated power. As the
legislative record stood, to allow Congress to render mere
possession of a weapon in a discrete location a federal crime
would seem to leave little else that would be beyond Congress'
commerce power. That neither Justice Breyer nor the Solicitor
General articulated a circumstance that would be beyond
Congressional power ceded the high ground to the majority.
Quite possibly, there is none that commends itself. If the majority
is correct - that "possession of a gun in a local school zone is in
no sense an economic activity that might... substantially affect
any sort of interstate commerce," 42 and that one could only
establish a nexus by piling up inferences - then it is arguable that
the majority is not wrong to make its stand in this case for the
principle that there is indeed some point at which use of the
commerce power to achieve a desirable social goal is
indefensible.
Lopez was not a lightning bolt from outer space. I believe it
was more like an accident waiting to happen. In Perez v. United
States,43 decided in 1971, the Court upheld as a valid exercise of
the commerce power, Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 44 which criminalized extortionate credit transactions that
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1634.
43. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
44. Pub. L. No. 90-321, Title II, §202(a), 82 Stat. 159, 18 U.S.C. § 891
(1994).
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were purely intrastate in character under the principle that they
nevertheless directly affected interstate commerce. Justice
Stewart dissented, arguing that "it is not enough to say that loansharking is a national problem, for all crime is a national
problem. It is not enough to say that some loan sharking has
interstate characteristics, for any crime may have an interstate
setting." 45 That same year, in United States v. Bass,4 6 Justice
Marshall's majority opinion affirmed the reversal of a conviction
for possession of firearms in violation of a provision of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 47 which
applied to any person convicted of a felony "who receives.
possesses, or transports in interstate commerce or affecting
commerce [any] firearm." 48 The government had contended that
the commerce limitations in the law applied only to "transports"
and that possession and receipt were punishable without showing
a connection with commerce. 49 The defendant argued that the
Commerce Clause did not constitutionally apply to simple
possession of a firearm. 50 The Court avoided that constitutional
claim by agreeing with Bass's threshold argument that the statute
was ambiguous and the rule of lenity, applicable to criminal
statutes, required that the statute be read to impose a requirement
that even as to possession, the government had to demonstrate a
51
commerce nexus.
Justice Stewart's Perez dissent and the Court's avoidance of the
constitutional issue in Bass suggested that a time might come
when Congressional crime control through the Commerce Clause
could cross the line into the general police power reserved to the
states. The absence of findings or a significant legislative record
in Lopez, plus the absence of any limiting principle, undoubtedly
combined to bring to fruition the type of concerns expressed by
45. Perez, 402 U.S. at 157 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
46. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a).

48. Id.
49. Bass, 404 U.S. at 338.

50. Id.
51. Id. at 347.
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Justice Stewart and those that were implicit in Bass.52 For these
reasons, Professor Gerald Gunther's comment that Lopez is a

"welcome warning shot across the Congressional bow" 53 may be
the most perceptive comment on Lopez of all.

If Professor Gunther's assessment is accurate, then Lopez is not

"important" as in "portentous." If Lopez is primarily a "warning
shot," it is intended to suggest strongly to Congress that it must
bring more to the table when its commerce legislation resembles

a simple criminal statute and little else. For the time being, I
believe the Gunther reading of Lopez is the most accurate. First,
the Court itself gave an immediate indication that it was not about
to rewrite the book on judicial review of Commerce Clause
legislation. Second, lower federal courts have not read Lopez that
54
way.
Within days of Lopez, the Court rendered a per curiam decision
in United States v. Robertson,5 5 in which, in the face of a

Commerce Clause challenge, it upheld a conviction under section
1962(a) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO). 5 6 Robertson had been convicted on various narcotics
charges and for having invested narcotics proceeds in an Alaskan
gold mine. 5 7 He was convicted under RICO for using those

proceeds in the "acquisition of any interest in, or the
establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged
52. I do not think that Scarboroughv. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977)
necessarily altered the Court's course. While the Court adopted a broad
construction of a federal criminal law in the face of federalistic concerns, it
was still a construction designed to avoid a constitutional decision. Id. at 572.
Scarborough involved the same provision regarding possession of firearms
that had been at issue in Bass. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
However, in Bass, the government had made no attempt at all to establish a
connection with commerce. In Scarborough it did, albeit minimally, by
showing that the firearms had once moved in interstate commerce.
Scarborough,431 U.S. at 575.
53. Aric Press & Bruce Shenitz, Justice: The Supreme Court Says No to
Congress, NEWSWEEK, May 8, 1995, at 72.
54. See infra notes and accompanying text 66-87.
55. 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988 & Supp. V).
57. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. at 1732.
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in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce." 58 The Court averted the Commerce Clause challenge
upon which the Ninth Circuit had based its reversal by observing
that both the court of appeals and the parties had miscast their
arguments by focusing on whether the activities of the gold mine
"affected" interstate commerce. 59 The Court found it
unnecessary to reach that argument because the trial evidence
focused primarily on the interstate activities of the mine.60 The
evidence established that much of the equipment for the mine had
not been purchased locally but had been transported in interstate
commerce. 6 1 It was also established that Robertson had brought
workers from outside Alaska to the mine and that he took about
fifteen percent of the mine's proceeds out of the state. 62 A Court
interested in continuing an onslaught on Congressional use of its
commerce power could have approached the case differently.
Since Lopez was decided, five circuit courts of appeal have
upheld against Commerce Clause challenges federal statutes
banning machine guns, 63 outlawing carjacking 64 and protecting
65
access to abortion clinics.
In United States v. Wilks, 6 6 the Tenth Circuit upheld a federal
statute which makes it illegal to transfer or possess a machine
gun manufactured after 1986.67 Like the statute struck down in

58. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)).
59. Id. at 1733.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
66. 58 F.3d 1518 (10th Cir. 1995).
67. Id. at 1522. See 18 U.S.C. § 922. Congress passed this section as part
of the Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100
Stat. 449 (1986), which amended the Gun Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 921-28. Section 922(o) states:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph 2, it is unlawful for any person to
transfer or possess a machinegun.
(2) This subsection does not apply with respect to--

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss2/5

12

Hellerstein: Criminal Law Decisions

1996]

CRIMINAL LAW DECISIONS

279

Lopez, the machine gun statute does not contain a jurisdictional

element. However, the court upheld the statute after concluding
that a machine gun - unlike the handgun in Lopez - is "an item
bound up with interstate attributes." 6 8 The Court further held
that machine guns are a "commodity ... transferred across state

lines for profit by business entities." 69

In United States v. Oliver,70 the Ninth Circuit upheld the
federal carjacking statute, emphasizing that the statute contained
an express interstate commerce element, which the statute in
Lopez did not. 7 1 The court also noted that, unlike in Lopez,
"Congress was not silent regarding the effect of carjacking on
interstate commerce."72

(A) a transfer to or by, or possession by or under the authority of,
the United States or any department or agency thereof or a
State, or a department, agency, or political subdivision

thereof; or
(B) any lawful transfer or lawful possession of a machinegun that
was lawfully possessed before the date this subsection takes
effect.
Id.
68. Wilks, 58 F.3d at 1521.
69. Id. (quoting United States v. Hunter, 843 F. Supp. 235, 249 (E.D.
Mich. 1994)).
70. 60 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1995).
71. Id. at 550. The court noted that the carjacking statute was very
different from the statute in Lopez. Id. First, the court stated that the statute
only applies to the taking of a car that has moved in interstate commerce. Id.
Secondly, the court said that cars themselves are "instrumentalities of
commerce." Id.
72. Id. Specifically, Congress relied on the increasing rate of motor
vehicle theft, the inability of local law enforcement agencies to prosecute
perpetrators effectively and "the emergence of carjacking as a 'high growth
industry' that involves taking stolen vehicles to different states to retifle,
exporting vehicles abroad or selling cars to 'chop shops' to distribute various
auto parts for sale." Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez, 49 F.3d 1398,
1400 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 749 (1996) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 102-852(1). 102d Cong., 2d Session 13-17, reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2829, 2833)).
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In similar fashion to Oliver, the Third Circuit upheld the statute
in United States v. Bishop.73 However, highly respected Judge
Edward R. Becker dissented, stating that Congress passed the
carjacking law not because it was worried about carjacking's
impact on interstate commerce but "as a response to its accurate
74
perception of carjacking as a crime of violence."
In Cheffer v. Reno, 75 the Eleventh Circuit held that the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act 7 6 was a valid
exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause power. 77 The court
pointed out that, unlike the statute in Lopez, the clinic access law
regulates commercial activity, specifically the provision of
reproductive
health
services, and
includes
extensive
congressional findings to support the conclusion that commerce is
substantially affected. 78 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the
reasoning employed by the district court in United States v.
Wilson. 79 In Wilson, the Wisconsin district court held that the
statute was beyond Congressional power because it does not
regulate commercial entities -- the reproductive health providers - "but rather regulates private conduct affecting commercial
entities." 80 The Cheffer court noted that the district court cited no
authority "for the proposition that Congress' Commerce Clause
authority extends only to the regulation of commercial actors,
and not private individuals who interfere with commercial

73. 66 F.3d 569 (1995). In Bishop, the Court held that Congress did not

exceed its authority under the Commerce Clause when it enacted the
carjacking statute because Congress had a rational basis for believing that
carjacking had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 576.
74. Id. at 591.
.75. 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1995).
77. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1521.

78. Id. at 1520.
79. 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 1995 WL 765450 (7th Cir. Dec.
29, 1995).
80. Id. at 678.
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activities in interstate commerce. " 8 1 The Fourth Circuit has also

82
upheld the statute in similar fashion.

On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has held that the
Commerce Clause does not reach simple arson of a private home
under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), which makes it a federal crime to

destroy by fire "any building... used in interstate or foreign

83
commerce or in any activity affecting interstate commerce."
The Commerce Clause link alleged by the government was that
the house obtained natural gas from the Pacific Gas & Electric

Company, some of which came from out-of-state sources. 84 The
court held that a private home that "merely receives natural gas
from

out-of-state

sources

is

neither

an

article

nor

an

instrumentality of commerce. The arson of such a structure has
only a remote and indirect effect on interstate commerce." 85
declared
Additionally,
an Arizona district court has
unconstitutional the 1992 Child Support Recovery Act, 86 which

makes it a federal crime for a parent to fail to pay child support
for an out-of-state child, as being in excess of Congress'
87
commerce power.

81. Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1520 n.6.
82. American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 55 (1995). The Fourth Circuit held that Congress passed
the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act based on an extensive
legislative record and that its regulatory measures were "reasonably adapted
to permissible ends." Id. at 647.
83. United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 524 (1995).
84. Id. at 525.
85. Id. at 528.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 228.
87. See United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360 (1995). The court
held that even though the statute requires diversity between the defendant and
the unsupported child, an interstate nexus without a substantial effect on
commerce is not enough. Id. at 1364. It emphasized that the statute is a
criminal statute that interferes with the states' own legislation concerning a
traditionally state problem, and that Congress did not make a plain statement
that it intended to so dramatically alter the balance between state and federal
relations. Id. at 1363. The court rejected the government's argument that the
statute is aimed at interstate "flight" by parents to avoid their obligation,
stating that there is no "flight" element in the statute. Id. at 1364. The court
also rejected the government's affectation argument which asserted that non-
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It seems fair to conclude that Lopez will bring to the Court as
many challenges to Congressional enactments under the
Commerce Clause as there are lawyers to construct them. But it
also seems possible to conclude that few, if any, statutes will be
found to suffer from the infirmities of the Gun Free School Zones
Act. 88 There may, indeed, be less to Lopez than meets the eye.

II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
In contrast with last term, in which no Fourth Amendment
rulings were handed down, this term produced three significant
decisions. The first case involved the Fourth Amendment in
conflict with computer-based error; the computer won.
In Arizona v. Evans,89 a 7-2 majority held that evidence seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment as the result of clerical
errors by court employees that caused incorrect computer records
fell within the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 90
Isaac Evans was stopped by police because he was driving the
wrong way on a one-way street. An immediate computer check
established that Evans' license had been suspended and that there
was an outstanding misdemeanor warrant for his arrest. Based on
that warrant, he was placed under arrest. While being
handcuffed, he dropped a marijuana joint and a search of his car
revealed a bag of marijuana under the passenger seat. When the
payment of child support affects the payment of federal welfare funds. Id. at
1365.
88. See supra note 14.
89. 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
90. Id. at 1194. The Court has concluded that the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule should be applied:
[W]here the officer's conduct is objectively reasonable, 'excluding the
evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any
appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that ... the officer is acting
as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances.
Excluding the evidence can in no way affect his future conduct unless it
is to make him less willing to do his duty.'
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-20 (1984) (quoting Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 539-40 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)).
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police notified the Justice Court that Evans had been arrested
pursuant to the outstanding warrant, they were informed that the
warrant had been quashed seventeen days earlier. Evans moved
to suppress, arguing that because the warrant had been quashed
his arrest was unlawful.
The trial court granted suppression because it concluded that
the State had been at fault for failing to quash the warrant. 9 1 The
court made no specific finding that the error was attributable to
the Sheriff's Office or the Justice Court. The Arizona Court of
Appeals reversed on the ground that "the exclusionary rule was
not intended to deter Sheriff's Office employees or court
employees who are not directly associated with the arresting
officers or their police department." 92 The Arizona Supreme
Court reversed and took the contrary position that the
exclusionary rule applied to court clerks as well as the police
because it would "hopefully serve to improve the efficiency of
those who keep records in our criminal justice system." 93
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, acknowledged
that Evans' Fourth Amendment rights were violated. However,
he reiterated that the exclusionary rule is a judicially-created rule
and that the issue of whether suppression is required is an issue
separate from that of whether the amendment has been violated. 94
Suppression was not required, he concluded, because the
arresting officer was entitled to act on the computer information
he possessed and that he had a duty to arrest Evans. 95
Application of the exclusionary rule to court or clerical
employees, Rehnquist concluded, will have no particular effect
because "they have no stake in the outcome of particular criminal
prosecutions. "96

91. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188.
92. Id.
93. Id.at 1189.
94. Id.at 1191.
95. Id. at 1193.
96. Id.
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Evans' counsel relied heavily on Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming
State Penitentiary,97 in which the Court held that Whiteley had
been arrested unlawfully when police acted on the basis of a
98
radio run that two suspects had been involved in two robberies.
The Court determined that because the information in the initial
report did not constitute probable cause, the arresting officers
were not insulated from its deficiencies and thus Whiteley's
arrest was unlawful. 9 9 Rehnquist dispensed with Whiteley by
reminding us that it pre-dated the Court's decisions in which the
issue of exclusion became separated from whether the Fourth
Amendment had been violated. 100
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, agreed
with the result but drew attention to the narrowness of the
Court's holding. 101 She emphasized that the decision was limited
to whether a court employee's departure from established
procedures should trigger the exclusionary rule. But whether the
police acted reasonably in their reliance on the recordkeeping
system itself was a different question. She said: "[s]urely it
would not be reasonable for the police to rely, say, on a
recordkeeping system, their own or some other agency's, that has
no mechanism to ensure its accuracy ...."102 Justice O'Connor
also thought that computer recordkeeping systems should be
scrutinized no less thoroughly than are informers on whom the
police are not entitled to blindly rely. 103
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred and pointed
out that there remained open still another question:
[H]ow far, in dealing with fruits of computerized error, our very
concept of deterrence by exclusion of evidence should extend to
97. 401 U.S. 560 (1971).

98. Id. at 568.
99. Id. at 568-69.
100. Evans, 115 S.Ct. at 1192. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468
U.S. 981 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1973).
101. Evans, 115 S.Ct. at 1194 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
102. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).

103. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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the government as a whole, not merely the police, on the ground
that there would otherwise be no reasonable expectation of
keeping the number of resulting false arrests within an acceptable
minimum limit. 104
Justice Stevens' dissent frontally attacked the majority's view.
Echoing themes that have been absent from the Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence for some time, Stevens reiterated the
Brandeisian theme that the Amendment "is a constraint on the
power of the sovereign, not merely on some of its agents."105 He
disputed that the exclusionary rule is "an extreme sanction" and,
citing to Justice Stewart's writings, pointed out that application of
the exclusionary rule merely put "the Government in the same
position it would have been had it not conducted the illegal
search and seizure in the first place." 10 6 Stevens also contended
that the good faith exception adopted in Leon did not apply to
Evans' arrest because "[t]he reasoning in Leon assumed the
existence of a warrant; it was, and remains, wholly inapplicable
to warrantless searches and seizures." 107 Stevens expressed very
strongly his belief that the offense to a citizen's dignity "who is
arrested, handcuffed, and searched on a public street simply
because some bureaucrat has failed to maintain an accurate
computer data base," 108 is no less outrageous than was the use of
general warrants to the authors of the Bill of Rights. 109
Justice Ginsburg's dissent, in which Justice Stevens joined,
stated that Evans' case was not "idiosyncratic." She focused on
the "new possibilities of error, due to both computer

104. Id. at 1195 (Souter, J., concurring).
105. Id. (Stevens, L, dissenting). See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 472-479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
106. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1195 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 1196 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1966). In Warden, Justice Douglas, in his dissent, noted that "the definition
of the general warrant included not only a license to search for everything in
a named place but to search all and any places in the discretion of the
officers." Id. at315.
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malfunctions and operator mistakes," 1 10 and concluded that
application of the exclusionary rule "may well supply a powerful
incentive to the State to promote the prompt updating of
computer records," and that this was the Arizona Supreme
111
Court's "hardly unreasonable expectation."
The result in Evans comes as no surprise. Once the Court, in
United States v. Calandra,112 began its separation of the
exclusionary rule from the Fourth Amendment itself, it created a
wide berth in which the deterrence rationale could be applied on
an ad hoc, rather than principled, basis. 113 This separation
allowed the Court ten years later to read into the Amendment's
warrant clause, a "good faith" exception that allowed searches
and seizures made pursuant to constitutionally deficient warrants

110. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1199 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 1200. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg also urged
that Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) should be overruled. Id. at
1203. In Long, the Court repudiated the long held presumption that, absent a
clear indication that a case coming from a state court decided a federal
question, the Court would presume that the lower court judgment rested on
an adequate state ground and thus was not reviewable. 463 U.S. at 1040-41.
Instead, it reversed the presumption by ruling that absent a clear statement
that the state court had rested its judgment on state law, the Court would now
assume that the judgment rested upon the state court's determination of the
federal issue. Id. Justice Ginsburg criticized the Long rule as an impediment
to the states' ability to serve their function as laboratories for developing
solutions to new legal problems. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1198 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Also, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that Long's plain statement
rule had greatly increased the number of non-dispositive United States
Supreme Court opinions because many state courts simply, on remand,
clarify their previous rulings and affirm the judgment on independent state
grounds. Id. at 1202 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The majority wanted no part
of Justice Ginsburg's call for an about-face and it will be a long time before
Long will be rethought. Why the Court reversed the Long presumption, of
course, is a subject for another day.
112. 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974).
113. Id. at 354 ("Questions based on illegally obtained evidence are only a
derivative use of the product of a past unlawful search and seizure. They
work no new Fourth Amendment wrong.").
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to survive. 114 In Evans, for the first time, the Court allowed a

"good faith" type exception to rescue a warrantless seizure of a
person insofar as the warrant relied on by the police no longer
existed in law. But as Justice Ginsburg pointed out, Evans is not
115
an isolated case.
To the extent that computer technology expands, the capacity
for both technological and human error also expands.
Consequently, the frequency with which personal liberty will be
limited because of such errors will also increase. Nonetheless,
the Court has determined that law enforcement should be the
beneficiary of such error, and not the citizen. By so holding, the
Court has removed a substantial incentive for law enforcement
agencies to take great care in the operation of their computer
systems. Whether the holding in Evans is as limited as some
116
members of the Court believe it is remains to be seen.

114. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that the
exclusionary rule should not applied when the officer conducting the search
acted on an objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a neutral
magistrate that is subsequently determined to be invalid); Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (same).
115. See Rogan v. Los Angeles, 668 F. Supp. 1384 (C.D. Cal. 1987). In
Rogan, an action was brought against the city of Los Angeles and its police
department after Terry Dean Rogan had been arrested five separate times on
the basis of incorrect information contained in records entered into the
F.B.I.'s National Crime Information Center. Id. at 1387-89; see also French
v. Chapman, 785 F. Supp. 1277, 1278-79 (N.D. 111.1992) (misinformation
in NCIC records twice caused plaintiff's arrest and detention), af'd, 991
F.2d 799 (7th Cir. 1993).
116. In a post-Evans case, the Florida Supreme Court held that police
failure to update their computer records triggered the exclusionary rule. In
State v. White, 660 So.2d 664 (Fla. 1995), the sheriff's department failed to
update its computer records for four days after an arrest warrant had been
served on the defendant. Id. at 665. A majority of the court held that the
police were not entitled to the good faith exception provided by Evans
because the other members of the sheriff's department knew that the warrant
had been served and was no longer valid. Id. at 668. Therefore, under the
"fellow-officer" rule of Wziteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971), the
arresting officer was charged with the knowledge that he had no authority to
arrest the defendant. Wite, 660 So.2d at 668.
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In Wilson v. Arkansas,117 the Court answered a question that
had remained open since the adoption of the Bill of Rights -- does
the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures require that, prior to execution of a search
or arrest warrant, the police knock and announce their
presence? 118 The good news is that it does. However, one's
exuberance may be tempered by the Court's relegation of police
failure to comply with the knock and announce requirement to
just one element in the reasonableness equation.
In Wilson, Arkansas police obtained a warrant to search the
defendant's home for drugs. They entered the premises through
an unlocked screen door, identifying themselves as they did so.
Inside the premises, they found drugs, drug paraphernalia, a gun
and ammunition. Wilson herself was discovered in the bathroom,
flushing marijuana down the toilet. She argued that the police
should have knocked and announced their purpose before
entering. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed Wilson's
conviction, noting that no Arkansas statute or common law
required the police to knock and announce when executing a
search warrant and that no such requirement was embodied in the
Fourth Amendment. 119
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas canvassed English
common law sources and determined that they left "no doubt that
117. 115 S.Ct. 1914 (1995).
118. In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40-41

(1963),

a plurality

determined that an unannounced entry was reasonable under the exigent
circumstance doctrine but the Court did not decide the broader issue of
whether absent exigent circumstances, such an entry would violate the Fourth
Amendment. In Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958), the Court
focused on whether announcement was required as a matter of statutory
interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3109 and did not reach the constitutional issue.
18 U.S.C. § 3109 states:

The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a
house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search
warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused
admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him
in the execution of the warrant."
Id.
119. Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1916.
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the reasonableness of a search of a dwelling may depend in part
on whether law enforcement officers announced their presence
and authority prior to entering." 12 0 He also found that "It]he
common-law knock-and-announce principle was woven quickly
into the fabric of early American law," 12 1 and that there could be
little doubt that the drafters of the Fourth Amendment believed it
was a factor in the assessment of the reasonableness of a search
or seizure.
Justice Thomas moved with alacrity, however, to caution that
"[t]he Fourth Amendment's flexible requirement of
reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of
announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement
interests." 122 He emphasized that the Court was "simply
hold[ing] that although a search and seizure of a dwelling might
be constitutionally defective if police officers enter without prior
announcement, law enforcement interests may also establish the
reasonableness of an unannounced entry." 12 3 Accordingly, he
noted that there was considerable authority for dispensing with
the knock-and-announce requirement in a variety of
circumstances such as threats to officer safety, escapes, or the
possibility of destruction of evidence. But Justice Thomas made it
clear that "we leave to the lower courts the task of determining
the circumstances under which an unannounced entry is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." 124

120. Id.
121. Id. at 1917. See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 259 Cal. Rptr. 846, 848
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) ("Announcement and demand for entry at the time of
service of a search warrant [is] part of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness."); People v. Saechao, 544 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Il. 1989)
("The presence or absence of such an announcement is an important
consideration in determining whether subsequent entry ... is reasonable.")
(internal question marks omitted); Commonwealth v. Groggin, 587 N.E.2d
785, 787 (Mass. 1992) ("Our knock and announce rule is one of common
law which is not constitutionally compelled.").
122. Wilson, 115 S. Ct. at 1918.
123. Id. at 1919.
124- Id.
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Perhaps there was no other way for the Court to treat the issue.
Certainly no one could argue that this case provided a vehicle for
deciding when and when not the police are required to knock and
announce. But it is arguable that the Court could have weighed in
much more heavily in favor of the knock and announce
requirement than it did. After all if, as history demonstrates, the
Framers were very concerned with such a requirement, then it
should not necessarily be embedded in a "totality of the
circumstances--just one element" approach. "Totality" cases
decided on an ad hoc basis by lower courts present several
problems. First, they tend generally to wind up in favor of the
police and against the interests of the premises' occupier. Second,
keyed as they are to the "exigent circumstance" doctrine, they
fluctuate in direct proportion to that doctrine. As some judges
have noted. when drugs are involved, virtually all circumstances
appear to be "exigent." 125 Third, because "totality" cases are so
fact-driven, very few will receive Supreme Court review,
regardless of their correctness as to the exigency issue.
Given the overriding interest which the Court has always
accorded the home, 126 it might have been better had the Court
held, as it has with the Warrant Clause, that entries without
compliance with the knock-and-announce requirement are
presumptively unreasonable. Such a presumption would not be
unduly burdensome to law enforcement interests. Just look at all
the exceptions to the warrant requirement itself that the Court has
made. 127 Of course, a logical response to this argument is that if
125. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 776-77 (2d Cir.
1990) (Kearse, J., dissenting) ("[a]fter this decision there appears to be little
left of the warrant requirement in narcotics cases"). cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1119 (1991).
126. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) ("Physical
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed.") (quoting United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
127. See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (holding that
there is no warrant requirement for seizure under the plain view doctrine as
long as the nature of the seizable item is immediately apparent); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (holding that a warrantless search incident
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such is the case with the Warrant Clause, the presumptive
approach is no better than the "totality" approach. Perhaps, but
with the presumptive approach, the dignity of a person's
premises is a touch greater and, in a troublesome case, may
receive more of the benefit of a doubt.
Justice Thomas left for another day the issue of whether
exclusion is a constitutionally compelled remedy where the
unreasonableness of a search stems from a police failure to knock
and announce. Arkansas argued that any evidence seized in that
circumstance is causally disconnected from the constitutional
violation itself and, as is the case with the "independent
source"

12 8

and "inevitable discovery" 12 9 doctrines, exclusion

exceeds the purpose of precluding the government from

benefiting from its unconstitutional conduct. Justice Thomas
noted that this remedial issue was not addressed by the lower
courts and was not, therefore, within the narrow question on

to a valid arrest is valid so long as it is limited to arrestee's person and area
within his immediate control); Camara v. Municipal Court of City and
County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (holding that a governmental
administrative policy which authorizes an inspector to enter premises without
a warrant and search for code violations without probable cause does not
violate the protections of the Fourth Amendment); Warden, Maryland
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (holding that a warrant to enter
one's home is not necessary when in 'hot pursuit' of a felon provided the
police have knowledge that the felon is dangerous); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925) (holding that the warrantless search of an automobile
based on exigency was valid based on the rationale that it was not
"reasonably practicable" for a police officer to go and get a warrant due to
the inherent mobility of the vehicle and the risk of loss of the evidence).
128. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 813-16 (1984). In Segura,
the Court held that whether the initial entry into the defendant's home was
illegal or not was irrelevant because there was an independent source for the
discovery of the challenged evidence and as such, suppression of the
evidence was not appropriate. Id at 814-15.
129. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440-48 (1984). In Nix, the Court
held that evidence relating to the discovery and condition of the victim's
body should have been admitted because it would have inevitably or
ultimately been discovered even in absence of a constitutional violation. Id.
at 449-50.
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which certiorari was granted. 130 I believe it a fair bet that the
issue will reach the Court in due course. 131
Of the Term's three Fourth Amendment decisions, I consider
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 132 the most important as
well as the most distressing. It may also contain Justice
O'Connor's finest moment in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence - unfortunately in dissent.

In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court held, by a 6-3 vote,
that school athletes can be subjected to random, suspicionless
drug testing. 133 Once again, the Court employed its judiciallycrafted "special needs" doctrine to water down Fourth
Amendment protections.
The Vernonia, Oregon School District adopted a drug testing
policy that required all interscholastic athletes sign a consent
form and obtain written parental consent to the testing. 134 During
the playing season, randomly picked athletes are required to
report to a locker room accompanied by an adult monitor of the
same gender. 135 The athletes are asked at that time to provide a
list of any prescription medication they may be taking. 136 Male
students then produce a urine sample at a urinal, remaining fully
clothed with their backs to the monitor, who stands
137
approximately twelve to fifteen feet behind the student.
Monitors may watch the student while he produces the
sample. 138 Female students produce samples in an enclosed stall:
they can be heard but not observed. 139 After the sample is
130. Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1919 n.4 (1995).
131. See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990) (holding that where the
police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, the exclusionary rule does not
bar the use of a statement made by the suspect outside his home even though
the statement is obtained after an in-house arrest in violation of Payton).
132. 115 S.Ct. 2386 (1995).

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 2396.
Id. at 2389.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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produced, it is given to the monitor, who checks it for
temperature and tampering and then transfers it to a vial. 140 The
samples are then sent to an independent laboratory for testing.
The school district implemented its drug testing policy as the
result of a sharp increase in drug use in the mid to late 1980's.
Although drug use extended well beyond student athletes, school
officials determined that student athletes were "leaders of the
drug culture" and "role models." 14 1 The officials were also
concerned about the increased risk of sports-related injuries.
In the fall of 1991, James Acton, a seventh grade student,
signed up to play football. 142 He was not allowed to play because
he and his parents refused to sign the testing consent forms. 143
The Actons filed suit in the district court which denied their
claims. 144 The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the testing
policy violated both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of
the Federal Constitution and Article I, section 9 of the Oregon
Constitution. 14 5

The question of whether compelled urine-testing constitutes a
search was settled six years ago in the Skinner14 6 and Von
Raab147 cases. Therefore, Justice Scalia reminded us, the
constitutionality of the test in the school context must be
determined under a "reasonableness" standard, which calls for
"balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2388-89.
142. Id. at 2390.
143. Id.
144. 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1355 (D. Ore. 1992).
145. 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994).
146. Skinner v. Railway Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989). In
Skimer, the Court held that mandatory drug and alcohol testing of railroad
employees was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment even in the absence
of a warrant or reasonable suspicion because the compelling governmental
interests outweighed the employees' privacy concerns. Id. at 633.
147. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656
(1989). In Von Raab, the Court held that suspicionless drug screening
through urinalysis of U.S. Customs Service employees applying for
promotions that involve interdiction of illegal drugs or require carrying a
firearm is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 677.
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interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests." 14 8 He reminded us further that when the government's
interests qualifies as a "special need," neither a warrant nor
probable cause is required, as was the case in New Jersey v.
T.L.O.149 where the Court determined that "special needs"
existed in the public school context.
Justice Scalia observed that public school children have fewer
and more limited rights than adults and that although children do
not "shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse
gate," 150 children "within the school environment have a lesser
expectation of privacy than members of the population
generally." 15 1 That lesser expectation emerges, he stated, from
the fact that they are children and that they "have been committed
to the temporary custody of the State as schoolmaster. " 152 The
school district was thus acting in its "custodial and tutelary"
capacity "permitting a degree of supervision and control that
could not be exercised over free adults." 153 Consequently, Scalia
reasoned, the "'reasonableness' inquiry cannot disregard the
schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility for children. "154 He
noted that for their own good and that of their classmates, public
school children are routinely required to submit to various
physical examinations, and to be vaccinated against various
diseases. Student athletes, he emphasized, have even less privacy
because, as the Seventh Circuit had put it, there is an "element of
'communal undress' inherent in athletic participation. " 155 In
148. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2390 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619).
149. 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985) (holding that reasonable suspicion is all
that is required for search of a student suspected of drug possession since the
warrant requirement would unduly interfere with maintenance of swift and
informal disciplinary procedures and the probable cause requirement would
undercut teachers' and administrators' need for freedom to maintain order).
150. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2392.
151. Id.(quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring)).
152. Id. at 2391.
153. Id. at 2392.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2393 (quoting Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe School Corp., 864
F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988)).
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addition, Justice Scalia observed, by choosing to compete in
sports, student athletes "voluntarily subject themselves to a
degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students
generally." 156 In this respect, student athletes are "[s]omewhat
like adults who choose to participate in a 'closely regulated
industry.'" 15 7

From his conclusion that student athletes have a diminished
expectation of privacy, Justice Scalia moved to an analysis of the
nature of the intrusion on that privacy. Unsurprisingly, he found
that it is "negligible. ' 158 He noted that the conditions under
which both male and females students produced urine samples
"are nearly identical to those typically encountered in public
restrooms, which men, women, and especially school children
use daily." 159 He further pointed out that the testing is limited in
scope because it looks only for drugs, not for other medical data
and that "the drugs for which the samples are screened are
standard and do not vary according to the identity of the
student." 160 Moreover, disclosure of test results is limited and
16 1
they are not turned over to law enforcement authorities.
Justice Scalia also rejected the argument that the policy is more
intrusive than it appears because students must identify in
advance prescription medications they are taking in order to
avoid sanctions for a false positive result. 162 He acknowledged
that in Von Raab the Court flagged as one of the salutary features
of the Customs Service drug testing program the fact that
employees were not required to identify in advance their own
medical information. But he was quick to point out that "we have
never indicated that requiring advance disclosure of medications

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2394.
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is per se unreasonable," 163 and that "[i]ndeed, in Skinner we
held that it was not 'a significant invasion of privacy.' 164
Finally, in what is the Court's major leap forward (or
backward depending on your frame of reference) from T.L. 0. is
its conclusion that reasonable suspicion is not required. 165 Justice
Scalia reasoned that the government's interest in deterring drug
use by all students and protecting the safety of athletes is
sufficiently important and that a suspicion-based policy may be
"impracticable." 166 Although he acknowledged that Skinner and
Von Raab indicated that a "compelling interest" is required
before the suspicion requirement may be eliminated,
"compelling" means just "an interest which appears important
enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other
factors which show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a
genuine expectation of privacy." 167 Here, Scalia said, "the
nature of the concern is important -- indeed, perhaps
compelling" 168 because "[s]chool years are the time when the
physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most
severe." 169 Furthermore,
the effects of a drug-infested school are visited upon not just the
users, but upon the entire student body and faculty, as the
educational process is disrupted. In the present case, moreover,
the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that this
evil is being visited not just upon individuals at large, but upon
children for whom it has undertaken a special responsibility of
care and direction. Finally, it must not be lost sight of that this
program is directed more narrowly to drug use by school
athletes, where the risk- of immediate physical harm to the drug

163. Id.

164. Id. (quoting Skinner v. Railway Executives Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 626
n.7 (1989)).
165. Id. at 2396.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2394-95.
168. Id. at 2395.

169. Id.
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user or those with whom he is playing his sport is particularly
high. 170
Justice Ginsburg concurred, expressing her belief that the
decision was limited in that it "reserv[ed] the question of whether
the District, on no more than the showing made here,
constitutionally could impose routine drug testing not only on
those seeking to engage with others in team sports, but on all
17 1
students required to attend school."
With due respect to Justice Ginsburg, I doubt very much that
when presented with the broader issue, the Court will cabin
Vernonia as Justice Ginsburg implies it might. Although student
athletes were purportedly "leaders of the drug culture," 172 the
school district's concerns were with the entire student body.
Indeed, the broader concern was credited by the majority when it
quoted from the district court's findings that "the administration
was at its wits end," and that "[d]isciplinary problems had
reached 'epidemic proportions.'" 173 Also, as prior cases such as
Skinner and especially Von Raab demonstrate, the Court has
shown a remarkable capacity to declare something a "special
need," and then determine that the Fourth Amendment's
components, a warrant, probable cause, or even reasonable
suspicion, are inoperative. If drug use is "epidemic" in a
particular school, I see little in the majority opinion or its
antecedent "special needs" rulings to put beyond bounds random
testing of an entire student body. Even if Justice Ginsburg joined
the three dissenters, Justices O'Connor, Stevens and Souter, the
required votes to cabin Vernonia as it is understood by Ginsburg
would fall a vote short.
Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion is as much a splendid
call for common sense in Fourth Amendment interpretation as it
is a reminder of how far the Court has departed from basic
Fourth Amendment principles. First, Justice O'Connor pointed
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2397.

172. See supra note 142.
173. Venonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1996

31

Touro Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 [1996], Art. 5

TOURO LAW REVIEW

298

[Vol 12

out that "[b]lanket searches, because they can involve 'thousands
or millions' of searches, 'pos[e] a greater threat to liberty' than
do suspicion-based ones which 'affec[t] one person at a
time.' 174 She quoted Chief Justice Taft's statement from the
landmark car search case, Carroll v. United States, 175 that it
"would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent
were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of
finding liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the
highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a
search." 176 She then demonstrated that the Framers abhorred
blanket searches even more than general searches:
Perhaps most telling of all, as reflected in the text of the Warrant
Clause, was the particular way the Framers chose to curb the
abuses of general warrants - and by implication - all general
searches - was not to impose a novel 'evenhandedness'
requirement. It was to retain the individualized suspicion
requirement contained in the typical general warrant and make
that requirement meaningful and enforceable, for instance by
raising the required level of individualized suspicion to objective
probable cause. 177
Justice O'Connor distinguished the Court's recent cases
upholding even-handed searches on the ground that they were
"outside the criminal context [and] in response to the exigencies
of modem life."

17 8

She explained that the Court had upheld those

174. Id. at 2397 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Illinois v. Krull, 480

U.S. 340, 365 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
175. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

176. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2398 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925)).

177. Id. at 2399 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 2400 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See, e.g., National Treasury
Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (customs agents who deal
with drugs and carry weapons); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'

Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (stating that it is impractical to require
individualized suspicion for drug testing in wake of a train accident because

of chaotic circumstances at scene); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691
(1987) (closely regulated business); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)

(visual body cavity searches of prisoners after contact visits); Camara v.
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searches "only after first recognizing the Fourth Amendment's
179
longstanding preference for a suspicion-based search regime,"
and only when "an individualized suspicion requirement was
often impractical ...."180
Justice O'Connor believed that the major fault with the
majority's opinion was its failure to "seriously engage] the
practicality" of an individualized suspicion requirement.1 8 1 She
pointed out that most of the evidence used by the district court to
justify the elimination of individualized suspicion "consisted of
first- or second-hand stories of particular, identifiable students
acting in ways that plainly gave rise to reasonable suspicion of
in-school drug use," that would have justified a search under
2
T.L.O. 18
That our society, due to its drug culture, has already paid a
substantial price in Fourth Amendment liberty and privacy
interests has long been apparent. From a dialectic that began with
the principle that all warrantless searches and seizures are
unconstitutional, subject to but a few exceptions, 183 we have
moved from acceptance of an enlarged category of warrantless
searches and seizures based on probable cause to searches and
seizures based only on reasonable suspicion and to searches and
seizures based on no individualized suspicion at all. While some
may say that Vernonia is not remarkable because it rests on the
Court's belief that public school children have fewer
constitutional rights while in school and is thus limited to the
school context, 184 I am not as sanguine. Even confined to the
public school setting, the decision is yet one more adjustment
downward in our national consciousness about the personal
Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (area-wide searches
of private residences for safety inspection purposes).
179. Id. at 2401 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 2402 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 2403 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
182. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
183. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
184. Ira Mickenberg, Court Settles on Narrower View of 4th Amendment,
NATiONAL LAW JOURNAL, July 31, 1995, p.C8.
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dignity that the Framers sought to secure for us. This was well
captured, as Justice O'Connor observed, in James Acton's
father's testimony at trial: "'[suspicionless testing] sends a
message to children that are trying to be responsible
citizens

. . .

that they have to prove that they're innocent

I think that kind of sets a bad tone for citizenship."'

185

. . .

and

III. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant's
sentence can be enhanced as a result of uncharged "relevant
conduct."' 186 What happens if the defendant is subsequently
187
convicted of that uncharged conduct? In Witte v. United States
the Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, held that the
Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated by the subsequent
189
conviction. 188 Justice Stevens was the sole dissenter.
Witte pleaded guilty to a federal marijuana charge. 190 The
presentence report calculated his base offense level under the
Guidelines by aggregating the total quantity of drugs not only in
Witte's offense of conviction but also in uncharged criminal
conduct in which he had engaged with several co-conspirators. 191
His sentence was thus greater than had only the drugs involved in
his conviction been considered but it was still within the
authorized penalty for his offense.
Witte was subsequently indicted for conspiring and attempting
to import cocaine. 192 He moved to dismiss the indictment on the
ground that the cocaine transaction had been considered as
"relevant conduct" at his marijuana sentencing and that he was

185. Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2405 (quoting Trial Transcript at 9).
186. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, §

1B1.3 (Nov. 1995).
187. 115 S. Ct. 2199 (1995).
188. Id. at 2209.
189. Id. at 2202.
190. Id. at 2203.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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thus being punished twice for the same crime. 193 The district
court dismissed the indictment, finding a violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 194 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
use of relevant conduct to increase the punishment for a charged
offense does not punish the offender for the relevant conduct. 195
In affirming, the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's reliance
on Williams v. Oklahoma. 196 In Williams, the defendant pleaded
guilty to murder and was given a life sentence. 197 He was
subsequently convicted of kidnapping and sentenced to death after
the judge took into account that the kidnapping victim had been
murdered. 198 Quoting from Williams, Justice O'Connor
explained that because Oklahoma law rendered "kidnapping a
separate crime, entirely distinct from the crime of murder, the
court's consideration of the murder as a circumstance involved in
the kidnapping crime cannot be said to have resulted in punishing
petitioner a second time for the same offense ... ."199 In
applying this principle in Witte, Justice O'Connor held that it
makes no difference that in Williams the enhancement occurred in
the second proceeding whereas in Witte, it took place in the first
proceeding. 200 She argued that:
the uncharged criminal conduct was used to enhance petitioner's
sentence within the range authorized by statute. If use of the
murder to justify the death sentence for the kidnapping
conviction was not 'punishment' for the murder in Williams, it is
impossible to conclude that taking account of petitioner's plans to
import cocaine in fixing the sentence for the marijuana
conviction constituted 'punishment' for the cocaine offenses. 20 1

193. Id. at 2203-04.

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 2204.
Id.
358 U.S. 576 (1959).
Id. at 578.
Id. at 581.
Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2206 (quoting Wiliams, 358 U.S. at 586).
Id.
Id.
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Moreover, she pointed out, "by authorizing the consideration of
offender-specific information at sentencing without the procedural
protections attendant at a criminal trial, our cases necessarily
imply that such consideration does not result in 'punishment' for
such conduct. "202
Justice O'Connor also rejected the notion that the Guidelines
change the constitutional analysis, holding that "a defendant has
not been 'punished' any more for double jeopardy purposes when
relevant conduct is included in the calculation of his offense level
under the Guidelines than when a pre-Guidelines court, in its
discretion, took similar uncharged conduct into account."203 In
each case, "the defendant is still being punished only for the
offense of conviction."204
Concurring, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, reiterated
his view that the Double Jeopardy Clause provides protection
only against twice being prosecuted for the same offense, and not
for twice being punished. 205
In dissent, Justice Stevens observed that it is one thing when a
sentencing judge reviews an offender's prior convictions at
sentencing and quite another when the offenses considered at
sentencing are linked to the offense of conviction. 20 6 In the first
instance, "the judge is not punishing that offender a second time
for his past misconduct, but rather is evaluating the nature of his
individual responsibility for past acts and the likelihood that he
will engage in future misconduct."207 In the latter instance,
"offenses that are linked to the offense of conviction may affect
both the character of the offense and the character of the
202. Justice O'Connor relied specifically on McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477

U.S. 79, 81 (1986) (upholding Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing Act which allowed an enhanced sentence for specified felonies if
the court found, "by a preponderance of evidence, that the defendant 'visibly
possessed a firearm' during the commission of the offense").
203. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2207.

204. Id.
205. Id. at 2209-10.
206. Id. at 2211.

207. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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offender." 2 0 8 When they affect the character of the offense and

not the character of the offender, he reasoned, the Double
Jeopardy Clause is implicated because "[a]t that point, the
defendant is being punished for having committed the offense at
issue, and not for what the commission of that offense reveals
about his character. "209
With both Williams and McMillan v. Pennsylvania2 10 on the

books, the result in Witte comes as no surprise. Although Justice
Stevens attempted to distinguish both cases, 2 1 1 there were no

other takers. The result of the case, however, adds yet another
layer of concern for defense counsel who must always consider
every possibility in advising a client about the wisdom of entering
a guilty plea. Justice O'Connor, in a portion of her opinion that
represents the view of five Justices, observed that the Sentencing
Guidelines provide some protection for a defendant who is
convicted of conduct that has been previously used as "relevant
conduct" under the Guidelines. 2 12 Here is what she said and I

quote extensively in the hope that defense counsel may benefit
from the possibilities that Justice O'Connor identifies:
Because the concept of relevant conduct under the Guidelines is
reciprocal, [Section] 5G1.3 operates to mitigate the possibility
208. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
209. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
211. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2213 (Stevens, I., dissenting). Justice Stevens
points out that Williams v. Oklahonm, 358 U.S. 576 (1959), was decided
before Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) which held the Double
Jeopardy Clause applicable to the States and applied only a 'watered down'
version of due process. Also, Williams never raised a double jeopardy
objection to his kidnapping prosecution - which would have paralleled
Witte's objection. Stevens also thought that Williams was wrongly decided.
Although he also believed McMillan was wrongly decided, he maintained that
it did not support the majority's position because two recent cases, United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) and Department of Revenue of
Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994), "emphatically rejected the
proposition that punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause only occurs
when a court imposes a sentence for an offense that is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt at a criminal trial." Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2213.
212. Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2208.
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that the fortuity of two separate prosecutions will grossly
increase a defendant's sentence. If a defendant is serving an
undischarged term of imprisonment "result[ing] from offense[s]
that have been fully taken into account [as relevant conduct] in
the determination of the offense level for the instant offense,"
[Section] 5G1.3(b) provides that "the sentence for the instant
offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the undischarged
term of imprisonment." And where [Section] 5G1.3(b) does not
apply, an accompanying policy statement provides, "the sentence
for the instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to
the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to the extent
necessary to achieve a reasonable incremental punishment for the
instant offense. "213

Even if the Sentencing Commission had not formalized
sentencing for multiple convictions in this way, district courts
under the Guidelines retain enough flexibility in appropriate
cases to take into account the fact that conduct underlying the
offense at issue has previously been taken into account in
sentencing for another offense. As the Commission has
explained, "under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) the sentencing court may
impose a sentence outside the range established by the applicable
guideline, if the court finds 'that there exists and aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence
different from that prescribed. "214 This departure power is also
available to protect against petitioner's second major practical
concern: that a second sentence for the same relevant conduct
may deprive him of the effect of a downward departure under
[Section] 5K1.1 of the Guidelines for substantial assistance to the
Government, which reduced his first sentence significantly.
Should petitioner be convicted of the cocaine charges, he will be
free to put his argument concerning the unusual facts of this case
to the sentencing judge as a basis for discretionary downward
departure. 2 15
213. Id. (citation omitted).
214. Id. (citation omitted).
215. Id. at 2208-09.
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Whether any defense attorney will feel comfortable with this
balm from Justice O'Connor is a question you can answer for
yourself.
IV. THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE
The Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause 2 16 has not, in
comparison with other provisions of the Constitution that affect
criminal justice, received much attention from the Court. Current
interest in the Clause's scope is triggered primarily by the
enactment of "Megan's Law" type statutes that require convicted
sex offenders to notify authorities when they return to a
community after having served their sentences. 2 17 Because those
statutes affect the liberty of prisoners whose sex crimes antedated
their enactment, they have been challenged as violative of the Ex
Post Facto Clause. The results have been mixed. The Supreme
Court's decision in California Dept. of Corrections v.
Morales,2 18 will not afford those challengers much solace.

Morales was sentenced in 1980 to fifteen years to life for the
murder of his wife. 2 19 This unfortunate woman, Lois
Washabaugh, was seventy-five years old when she met Morales,
who was serving a life sentence for the 1970 murder of his
girlfriend. 2 20
Ms. Washabaugh met him because she had begun visiting
inmates in California's Soledad Prison after gaining an interest in

216. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, Cl. 1. This clause states in pertinent part:
"No state shall ...

pass any... ex post facto

aw ....

.".

Id.

217. See, e.g., Sexual Offender Registration Act, N.J. STAT.ANN. § 2C:71 et seq. (Vest

1995); Registration of Sex Offenders,

ARIZ. REv.

STAT.ANN. § 13-3821 (West 1995); Sex Offender Registration Law, MiNN.
STAT. § 243.166 (Supp. 1993); Convicted Sex Offender Act, NEB. RE%.
STAT. § 29-2922 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1992).
218. 115 S. Ct. 1597 (1995).
219. Id. at 1600.
220. Id.
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prison reform. 22 1 She married Morales some time after his
to a halfway house in 1980.222
release
At the time Morales murdered his wife,
California law
provided that prisoners such as Morales were entitled to parole
suitability hearings on an annual basis. 223 However, in 1981, the
California Legislature changed the law by authorizing the Parole
Board, after the prisoner's first parole hearing,
to defer subsequent suitability hearings for up to three years if
the prisoner has been convicted of more than one offense which
involves the taking of a life and if the Board finds that it is not
reasonable to expect that parole would be granted at a hearing
during the following years and states the basis for the finding. 224
Morales became eligible for parole in 1990 and he appeared
before the Parole Board in July, 1989.225 In a decision that did
not send shock waves through the state including, I am sure, the
defense bar, the Board determined that Morales was unsuitable
for parole, citing factors such as the mutilation of his wife before
and after he killed her, his record of violence and assaultive
behavior, and his commission of the second murder while he was
on parole for his first. 226 The Board also determined that it was
not reasonable to expect that Morales would become eligible for
parole in 1990 or 1991.227 Consequently, pursuant to the 1981
amendment, it scheduled Morales' next hearing for 1992.228
Morales filed a federal habeas corpus petition asserting
violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 229 The district court
denied the petition but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
"any retrospective law .making parole hearings less accessible

221. Id.
222. Id. at 1599-1600.
223. Id. at 1600.
224. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE ANN.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.

§ 3041.5(b)(2) (West 1982)).
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would effectively increase the [prisoner's] sentence and violate
the ex postfacto clause." 230
In a 7-2 decision, with Justice Thomas writing, the Supreme
Court reversed. 23 1 Pointing to precedents dating back many
years, 232 Thomas reiterated that the Ex Post Facto Clause is
aimed at laws that "retroactively alter the definition of crimes or
increase the punishment for criminal acts." 233 The question
before the Court was whether the 1981 amendment increases the
"punishment" attached to Morales' 1980 murder of his wife.234
Justice Thomas held that it did not.235 In arriving at that
determination, he had to distinguish three cases upon which
Morales relied: Lindsey v. Washington,23 6 in which a statute was
held unconstitutional because it required a judge to impose a
maximum fifteen year sentence and superseded a statute that

authorized judges to impose an indeterminate sentence not in
excess of fifteen years, and Weaver v. Graham,237 and Miller v.
Florida,238 two cases in which statutes that changed the
substantive "formula" used to calculate the applicable sentencing
range were found to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because
they increased the "quantum of punishment" to which the
defendants were exposed.
That was not the case in Morales, concluded Justice
Thomas. 239 The 1981 amendment, he pointed out, did not change
the substantive formula for securing any reductions to the fifteen
to life sentence that was prescribed both before and after the 1981

230. Id.
231. Id. at 1599.
232. Id. at 1601 (citing Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990); Beazell
v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386,
391-92 (1798)).
233. Id. (citations omitted).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1605.
236. 301 U.S. 397 (1937).
237. 450 U.S. 24 (1981).

238. 482 U.S. 423 (1987).
239. Morales, 115 S. CL at 1602.
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amendment to the parole procedure. 240 Nor did it have any effect
on the standards for fixing a prisoner's initial date of eligibility
for parole. 24 1 The only change that the 1981 amendment did
make, Justice Thomas observed, is that "it introduced the
possibility that after the initial parole hearing, the Board would
not have to hold another hearing the very next year, or the year
after that, if it found no reasonable probability that respondent
' 242
would be deemed suitable for parole in the interim period."
Therefore, Justice Thomas reasoned, "[r]ather than changing the
sentencing range applicable to covered crimes, the 1981
amendment simply 'alters the method to be followed' in fixing a
243
parole release date under identical substantive standards."
Justice Thomas rejected Morales' argument that "the Ex Post
Facto Clause forbids any legislative change that has any
conceivable risk of affecting a prisoner's punishment."' 244 The
question, he stated, was one of degree and that the Court must
decide whether the 1981 amendment "produces a sufficient risk
of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered
crimes." 245 He emphasized that it did not because it "applies
only to a class of prisoners for whom the likelihood of release on
parole is quite remote,"' 246 and that the Parole Board's authority
under the amendment is carefully tailored to the legitimate end of
relieving the Board from the burdens of conducting parole
hearings who have no realistic chance for parole. 247 The Ex Post
Facto Clause was not violated, Justice Thomas concluded, by
legislation that "creates only the most speculative and attenuated
risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the
24 8
covered crimes."240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 433 (1987)).
Id.
Id. at 1603 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1604.

248. Id. at 1605.
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Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, dissented. 249 His
argument rested on four main assertions: (1) the importance
which the Framers placed on the Ex Post Facto Clause had led
the Court to always enforce it scrupulously; 250 (2) a prisoner
need not establish that retroactive application of a law authorizing
increased punishment actually affected his sentence; 25 1 (3)
retroactive statutes increasing punishment were impermissible if
they affected parole or early release, not just initial
sentencing; 252 and (4) "an increase in punishment occurs when
the State deprives a person of the opportunity to take advantage
of provisions for early release." 253 He also disputed that the
1981 amendment was a cost-cutting measure, 254 calling it
"vindictive legislation" against a small but unpopular group of
prisoners - multiple murderers. 255 And, "the narrower the class
burdened by retroactive legislation," he pointed out, "the greater
the danger that the legislation has the characteristic of a bill of
attainder."256

Justice Stevens also concluded that whether the 1981
amendment actually increased punishment was not, as the
majority determined, "speculative." 25 7 In his view, it "runs in
the other direction" 25 8 because "[b]y postponing and reducing
the number of parole hearings . . . the amendment will at best

leave an inmate in the same position he was in, and will almost
inevitably delay the grant of parole in some cases."259
As a purely logical matter, Justice Stevens may have the better
of the argument. His analysis of the relevant precedents is more
persuasive. To avoid their impact, Justice Thomas had to make a
249. Id.

250. Id. at 1606 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 1607 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
252. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1609 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1608 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1611 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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slight adjustment through excision of the "disadvantage"
language of the earlier cases, and cast his analysis in terms of
"degree." 260 Stevens seems accurate in concluding that, under
the 1981 amendment, some prisoners will be disadvantaged
because, under the prior statute, one or more might have been
paroled earlier. As a practical matter, however, the facts of the
case made that concept difficult to embrace -- other than as a

purely hypothetical construct. The prospect that Morales, or
multiple murderers like him, would see the street earlier but for
the 1981 amendment might strike some as a laughable
proposition.
Not so laughable is a recent across the board increase in the
security classifications of Maryland prisoners serving life
sentences. 26 1 In the first decision to apply Morales, the federal
district court for Maryland held that a new classification scheme
adopted by prison authorities violated the Ex Post Facto Clause
because unlike the parole scheme alteration challenged in
Morales, the impact on the prisoners, although lifers, was not
speculative. 262 Under Maryland's new classification scheme,
lifers can no longer be granted pre-release security.263 Without
that classification, they can no longer participate in work-release
programs. Since existing Parole Commission policy requires
work-release as a prerequisite for parole, lifers are now
precluded from ever being granted parole. 264 Although the court
acknowledged that lifers are only rarely granted parole, that
opportunity "did exist for lifers who displayed an exceptional
attitude and who compiled an excellent record while
incarcerated." 265 By shutting down that possibility, the court
concluded, the new classification scheme snuffed out the "[h]ope
and the longing for reward for one's efforts [which] lie at the

260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 1603.
Knox v. Lanham, 895 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md. 1995).
Id. at 758.
Id.

264. Id.
265. Id.
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heart of the human condition." 266 Whether, if appealed, this case

will not be controlled by Morales remains to be seen.
V. HABEAS CORPUS
Two features characterize the Court's recent habeas corpus
jurisprudence: the intricate nature of the cases and the
coalescence, of a Court majority to fend off further major
substantive onslaughts on the Great Writ. In O'Neal v.
McAninch, 2 6 7 the Court split 6-3 in what was a rather strange
case factually. The petitioner filed a federal habeas petition
challenging his state court conviction for murder and other
crimes. 26 8 The district court agreed with several of his claims of
constitutional trial error.2 69 The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the
district court except for one issue - possible jury confusion
caused by a trial court instruction as to the state of mind required
for conviction combined with a related statement by the
prosecutor. 270 The court of appeals applied the harmless error
standard appropriate to federal habeas corpus cases decreed two
years in Brecht v. Abrahamson:27 1 "whether the error 'had
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury's verdict.'"272 However, Justice Breyer, writing for the
Court, construed the court of appeals' opinion as follows: "rather
than ask directly whether the record's facts satisfied this

266. Id.
267. 115 S. Ct. 992 (1995).
268. Id. at 994.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
272. O'Neal, 115 S. Ct at 994 (quoting Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1712). Brecht
had lowered the harmless error standard for federal habeas courts by holding
that federal constitutional error can be deemed harmless even if the habeas
court would not hold the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as
required by Chapman v. California, 368 U.S. 18, 21-24 (1967). for state
court review of the same error.
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'273
standard, the court seemed to refer to a burden of proof."
This meant that

if a judge is in grave doubt about the
[a]s a practical matter,.
effect on the jury of this kind of error, the petitioner must lose.
Thus, O'Neal might have lost in the Court of Appeals, not
because the judges concluded that the error was harmless, but
because the record of the trial left them in grave doubt about the
274
effect of the error.
Having read the court of appeals' opinion in this fashion,
Justice Breyer held that "[w]hen a federal judge in a habeas
proceeding is in grave doubt about whether a trial error of federal
law had a 'substantial and injurious effect or influence in
' 275
determining the jury's verdict,' that error is not harmless."
This result, he explained, was compelled by precedent. 2 76 The
decision on which Brecht was based, Kotteakos v. United
States,277 stated, in the context of direct review of nonconstitutional errors, that "if one is left in grave doubt, the
conviction cannot stand." 278
One problem with this approach was that Brecht itself stated
that habeas petitioners "are not entitled to habeas relief based on
trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in 'actual
prejudice." 279 Justice Breyer averted this by pointing out that the
passage was not supported by Justice Stevens and thus did not
command a majority of the Brecht Court; it was also inconsistent
with the Kotteakos rule itself.280
Justice Breyer also brushed aside the argument that habeas
corpus proceedings, being civil proceedings, placed on habeas
petitioners the burden of proof normally carried by civil suit
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

O'Neal, 115 S. Ct. at 994.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 995.
328 U.S. 750 (1946).
Id. at 765.

279. O'Neal, 115 S.Ct at 995-96 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S.
Ct. 1710, 1721 (1993)).
280. Id. at 996.
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plaintiffs. Habeas proceedings were different, he observed,
because of the stakes involved. 28 1 Moreover, he maintained, civil
cases involving "grave doubt" are in accord with the majority's
rule. 282
In addition, Justice Breyer argued that giving the benefit of the
doubt to the habeas petitioner in this kind of close case serves
283
"the basic purposes underlying the writ of habeas corpus."
When the final conclusion about harmlessness is difficult to
draw, coming down in favor of the writ "both protects
individuals from unconstitutional convictions and helps to
guarantee the integrity of the criminal process by assuring that
trials are fundamentally fair." 284
Justice Thomas, joined in dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia, agreed with the State that absent a finding that
the error was harmful, the statutory basis for habeas relief has
not been triggered. 28 5 The habeas petitioner should bear the
burden of showing that the error caused his custody, just as a
civil plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct caused
harm, Thomas argued. Placing the burden on the petitioner is
also appropriate, he said, in light of the strong protections the
criminal justice system affords against convicting the innocent
and the affront to state interests that habeas review represents.
It is difficult to think of a Supreme Court decision with less
pragmatic consequence than this one. It came about only because
the Court construed the court of appeals' opinion as one in which
the judges below were in "grave doubt" or in "virtual equipoise"
about the effect of the state trial court's error. But for one
instance, 286 I have never known a judge to declare him or herself
in "equipoise." Judges will continue to decide in habeas
281. Id.

282. Id. at 996-97.
283. Id. at 997.

284. Id. (citation omitted).
285. Id. at 999.
286. That instance occurred at the end of a non-jury criminal trial at which
a Justice of the New York Supreme Court of rather colorful mien declared
himself "hung."(Leff, J., N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
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proceedings, even close ones, whether the error was harmless or
not.
However, O'Neal has considerable symbolic significance. It is
another decision in which a majority has retarded the erosive
process that has marked much of the Court's habeas
jurisprudence over the last fifteen years. While in contrast with
the Court's major substantive regressions of recent years, there is
little substantive harvest in O'Neal; the language and spirit of the
majority opinion reflects a deeper appreciation of the Great Writ
than we are accustomed to from the Court. That the Court's
newest member, Justice Breyer, is so disposed augurs well for
those who believe that further dismantling of habeas corpus
protections is undesirable.
In Schlup v. Delo,287 a 5-4 majority did render a significant
doctrinal decision that is favorable to habeas petitioners. The case
required an elaboration of the "miscarriage of justice" exception
to the rules against federal habeas courts' consideration of
procedurally barred claims. In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the
Court held that habeas petitioners who allege constitutional
violations in the proceedings leading up to their convictions and
who claim to be actually innocent have a lesser burden to carry
than those who claim only to be "innocent" of the death
penalty. 288 What must be shown, the majority held, is that "a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of
one who is actually innocent." 289 In other words, the petitioner
"must show that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in
the light of the new evidence," rather than prove it by the more
demanding "clear and convincing" standard applied by the lower
court. 290

Lloyd Schlup was convicted of murder and sentenced to death
29 1
for his alleged part in the stabbing of a fellow prison inmate.
At trial, he claimed that the state's witnesses had misidentified
287. 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995).
288. Id. at 861.

289. Id. at 864 (citations omitted).
290. Id. at 865 (citations omitted).
291. Id. at 854.
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him. 2 9 2

He presented evidence that he was in the prison dining
room some distance from the scene of the stabbing more than a
minute before corrections officers left the dining room to respond
to a distress call. 293 The exact time at which the distress call was
made became a key issue at trial. 294 Schlup was convicted and
his conviction was affirmed on appeal. 295 He also was
unsuccessful in his first federal habeas petition. 296
Schlup filed a second habeas petition in which he claimed to be
innocent, alleged that his attorney had rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to interview witnesses who could have
provided favorable evidence on the timing and identification
issues, and asserted that the prosecution withheld such evidence
in violation of Brady v. Maryland.2 97
Because Schlup's habeas petition was a successive one, his
claims were barred absent a showing of cause and prejudice
pursuant to Wainwright v. Sykes. 2 98 Schlup did not show cause
and the Eighth Circuit held that he also did not make the showing
necessary for consideration of the barred claims under the
"fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception to the cause and
prejudice requirement.
Justice Stevens held that the court of appeals applied the wrong
formulation of the miscarriage of justice standard. He
distinguished the case from Herrera v. Collins,2 99 in which a
death row inmate had also put forth a claim of actual innocence.
Both Herrera and Schlup brought forth new evidence to show
their innocence. However, Schlup made a "procedural" claim in
that he attacked the fairness of the prior proceedings; in contrast,
Herrera made the "substantive" claim that executing an innocent
person would violate the Eighth Amendment. Justice Stevens
292. Id. at 854-857.
293. Id. at 855.

294.
295.
296.
297.

Id.
Id. at 856.
Id. at 856-57.
373 U.S. 83 (1963). See infra note 307 and accompanying text.

298. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).

299. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
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wrote that because Schlup "accompanie[d] his claim of innocence
300 his
with an assertion of constitutional error at trial,"
conviction "may not be entitled to the same degree of respect" 30 1
as Herrera's. Justice Stevens compared the burdens on Schlup
and Herrera:
In Herrera (on the assumption that petitioner's claim was, in
principle, well founded), the evidence of innocence would have
had to be strong enough to make his execution 'constitutionally
intolerable' even ifhis conviction was the product of a fair trial.
For Schlup, the evidence must establish sufficient doubt about his
guilt to justify the conclusion that his execution would be a
miscarriage of justice unless his conviction was the product of a
fair trial. 302
Justice Stevens acknowledged the development of the rules
disfavoring review, on federal habeas corpus, of claims raised in
second and subsequent petitions. He noted that those rules reflect
concerns for comity but he also pointed out that equitable
concerns have led the Court to recognize an exception for
"fundamental miscarriages of justice,"303 an exception linked
explicitly to claims of actual innocence.
The Eighth Circuit's error, Justice Stevens stated, was in
applying the standard set forth in Sawyer v. Whitley. 304 In that
case, in which the petitioner claimed to be actually innocent of
the death penalty, i.e. that death was not the proper penalty, the
miscarriage of justice doctrine requires the petitioner to "show by
clear and convincing evidence that but for a constitutional error,
no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for
the death penalty."305 the balance of competing interests is
different, Stevens explained, when the argument is that
constitutional error resulted in the conviction of one who is
actually innocent. Substantial claims of this kind are "extremely
300. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 861.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 861-62 (emphasis in original).

303. Id. at 864.
304. 505 U.S. 333 (1992).

305. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 865 (quoting Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 336).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss2/5

50

Hellerstein: Criminal Law Decisions

1996]

CRIMINAL LAW DECISIONS

317

rare" and thus pose fewer threats to scarce judicial resources and
the interests in finality and comity than claims going to the
sentence alone. 306 "Of greater importance," he said, "the
individual interest in avoiding injustice is most compelling in the
context of actual innocence. The quintessential miscarriage of
justice is the execution of a person who is entirely innocent." 307
The proper standard for such a case comes not from Sanyer but
from Murray v. Carrier,3 08 and requires only a showing that "a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of
one who is actually innocent." 309
Justice Stevens explained further that the Murray standard
differs from that which applies to claims of insufficient evidence.
The petitioner "must show that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new
evidence." 3 10 This is more than a showing of "prejudice" under
Wainwright v. Sykes, 3 11 but less exacting than Sawyer's clear and
convincing evidence test. In arriving at a decision, Stevens said
the habeas court is to consider not only the evidence introduced
at trial but also relevant evidence that was excluded or
unavailable at that time. 3 12 In essence, the habeas court's job is
"to make a probabilistic determination about what reasonable,
properly instructed jurors would do."313 If the new evidence
calls into question the credibility of the witnesses who testified at
trial, the court will have to make credibility assessments.
Justice O'Connor concurred briefly, noting that under the
majority opinion, the burden on the petitioner is higher than what
is required to show prejudice under the Strickland standard. 3 14
306. Id.

307. Id. at 866 (citations omitted).
308. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
309. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 867 (citations omitted).
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id.
433 U.S. 72 (1977).
Id.
Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 868.
Id. at 869-70 (referring to Strickladu v.

ashington, 466 U.S. 668.

695 (1984) (the standard for prejudice requires only "a reasonable probability
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She also pointed out that the Court did not decide whether the
miscarriage of justice exception is a discretionary remedy or
whether abuse of discretion is the proper standard of appellate
review. O'Connor concluded that the lower court's ruling was
quintessentially an abuse of discretion because it had based its
judgment on an erroneous rule of law by applying the Sawyer v.
Whitley standard.
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Justices Kennedy
and Thomas. 3 15 He argued that the Court should have applied
Sawyer and that it erred further by adopting a watered down
version of the Murray standard. 3 16 The confusion, he claimed,
came from the majority's mixing of "a quintessential charge to a
finder of fact," the "more likely than not" component of the test,
with "a quintessential conclusion of law" -- the "no reasonable
3 17
juror would have convicted" component.
Justice Scalia also dissented, joined by Justice Thomas. 3 18 He
was distressed that the majority decided the case by focusing on
fairness rather than by reference to the language of 28 U.S.C. §
2244, which addresses second and subsequent habeas
petitions. 3 19 The statute, Scalia argued, contains no authority for

that absent the errors, the factf'mder would had have a reasonable doubt

respecting guilt")).
315. Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 870.
316. Id. at 873 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
317. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 874.
319. Id. at 875 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Section 2244(b) provides:

When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual
issue, or after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court has been denied by a
court of the United States or a judge of the United States release from
custody or other remedy on an application for a writ of habeas corpus,
a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of such
person need not be entertained by a court of the United States or a
justice or judge of the United States unless the application alleges and
is predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the
hearing of the earlier application for the writ, and unless the court,
justice, or judge is satisfied that the applicant has not in an earlier
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the result reached by the majority. By ignoring the statute, the
Court's decision amounts to a directive that federal courts must,
in certain circumstances, consider barred claims.
Of the habeas corpus decisions rendered during the Term, none
produced as much vitriol from the dissenters as did Kyles v.
Whitley. 320 Justice Scalia proclaimed that "[t]he greatest puzzle
of [this] decision is what could have caused this capital case to be
singled out for favored treatment." 32 1 His distress undoubtedly
resulted from the fact that the case does not break significant new
ground, either in habeas corpus jurisprudence or in Brady v.
Maryland32 2 doctrine. Whether his protest is warranted depends
on whether he is correct that for it to command the Court's time
and attention, even a capital case must have broader
constitutional significance to the nation than did this one.
The nub of the case was whether Kyles' Louisiana murder
conviction should be overturned on federal habeas because state
prosecutors withheld information that could have been favorable
to him. Kyles was convicted of shooting a woman in a grocery
store parking lot in New Orleans. 323 The perpetrator drove off in
the woman's car.3 24 Some forty-eight hours later, "Beanie"
Walton contacted the police and told them that he believed that a
car he bought from Kyles belonged to the deceased. 325 In a
subsequent interview, Beanie suggested that the police search
Kyles' trash for the victim's purse. 326 The police did so on the
next scheduled trash pickup day and incriminating evidence was
found. 327 Beanie also told the police that the murder weapon

application deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground or
otherwise abused the writ.

Id.
320. 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995).
321. Id. at 1577 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Whit/ey, 115 S. Ct. at 1560.
Id.
Id. at 1561.
Id. at 1562.
Id. at 1563.
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would be found in Kyles' apartment, and it was. 328 A number of
eyewitnesses identified Kyles as the victim's assailant but there
329
were discrepancies in their testimony.
The evidence withheld by the prosecution included
contemporaneous statements taken by police from eyewitnesses,
records of Beanie's initial call to the police and of a subsequent
conversation he had with two officers, a signed statement he gave
still later, an internal police memo calling for the seizure of
330
Kyles' trash, and evidence linking Beanie to other crimes.
Beanie's story, which changed a number of times during the
investigation stage, changed yet again in an interview conducted
by the prosecutor after Kyles' first trial ended in a hung jury.
The prosecutor's notes of that interview were not disclosed to the
defense. It was the defense theory that Beanie, who never
testified was, in fact, the murderer.
Brady held that, as a matter of due process, the prosecution has
the duty to disclose to the defense evidence that is "material" and
favorable to the accused. 331 In United States v. Bagley, 332 the
Court stated that favorable evidence is material, and
constitutional error results from its suppression, "if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. "333
Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Souter focused on four
aspects of materiality that were germane. First, he pointed out
that "a showing of materiality does not require demonstration by
a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would
have resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal." 334 Second,
Bagley does not call for a "sufficiency of evidence" test -- the
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id. at 1562.
Id. at 1560-61.
Id. at 1562.
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
473 U.S. 667 (1985).

333. Id. at 682. In addition, "[a] 'reasonable probability' is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id.
334. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. at 1566.
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"defendant need not demonstrate that after discounting the
inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there
would not be enough left to convict. " 335 Third, "once a

reviewing court applying Bagley has found constitutional error
there is no need for further harmless error review."336 The court
of appeals had assumed the contrary and Justice Souter pointed
out that the harmless error standard now applicable on federal
habeas review as per Brecht v. Abrahamson,337 had previously
been proposed as a materiality standard under Brady but had been
rejected by the Court as insufficiently demanding. 338 Last,
Justice Souter emphasized that materiality is defined "in terms of
suppressed evidence considered collectively, not item-byitem. "339

Applying these principles to the evidence withheld by the
prosecution, Justice Souter demonstrated how it could have been
used by the defense to cast doubt on the prosecution's case. (And
here I am moving very skimpily given the extensive factual
nature of the case). He pointed out how the state's best
eyewitness, who testified he had seen the actual shooting, could
have been impeached with the description he initially gave of the
perpetrator, which matched Beanie, rather than Kyles, in terms
of weight, height, and build. Access to the initial statement of a
second eyewitness could have persuaded the jury that Beanie's
much more detailed and positive trial testimony was the result of
coaching.
Justice Souter further pointed out that Beanie's undisclosed
statements "would have raised opportunities to attack not only the
probative value of crucial physical evidence and the
circumstances in which it was found, but the thoroughness and
even the good faith of the investigation, as well."340 He reasoned
that the defense would have been able to trip Beanie up on almost
335. Id.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id.
113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
Whitley, 115 S. Ct. at 1567.
Id.
Id. at 1571.
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any important thing that he said and even if Beanie had not been
called to testify, the defense could have capitalized by showing
the "remarkably uncritical attitude" the police displayed toward
Beanie. 34 1 Concluding that the physical evidence against Kyles
was inconclusive, Justice Souter held that the Court could not be
confident that the jury's verdict would have been the same had
342
the withheld evidence been disclosed.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer,
concurred in Justice Souter's opinion, 343 but he also felt
compelled to respond to Justice Scalia's vehement criticism of the
decision to grant certiorari. He explained that even though no
"newly minted rule of law" 3 4 4 emerged from the Court's labors
(although it presented "an important legal issue"), 345 the case
merited review for at least three reasons. First, the jury's
inability to reach a verdict in the first trial provided "strong
reason to believe the significant errors that occurred at the second
trial were prejudicial." 346 Second, cases with this much
undisclosed exculpatory evidence are extremely rare. 347 Third,
Justice Souter's "independent review of the case left me with the
same degree of doubt about petitioner's guilt expressed by the
dissenting judge [in the court below]. "348 Also, that this is a
capital case cannot be ignored, Stevens said, and while he wished
that "such review were unnecessary," he could not "agree that
our position in the judicial hierarchy makes it inappropriate. "349
The question that remains is how significant is the decision in
Kyles. The legal principle announced is that in determining
whether evidence withheld by the prosecution is "material" under
Brady, the effect of all suppressed evidence favorable to the

341. Id.
342. Id.at 1575.
343. Id.at 1576.

344. Id. at 1576 (Stevens, J., concurring).
345. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
346. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).

347. Id. at 1576.
348. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
349. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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accused must be considered cumulatively, rather than on an itemby-item basis. 350 However, this principle had already been
enunciated in Bagley, and it is not even clear that the court of
appeals had failed to apply it to the facts in Kyles. In a
constitutional sense, we can accept the Court's ruling as a
reiteration of Bagley but for little else. The true significance of
the case, for me, is that five justices refused to allow a capital
verdict to stand when they harbored serious doubt about the
defendant's guilt. To demand of a Supreme Court justice that he
or she turn a blind eye in such a circumstance purely for
institutional reasons strikes me as both unreasonable and
unnecessary. It is not a stain on the Court's escutcheon to
occasionally intervene, at least in a capital case, when it believes
that a grievous injustice has been done, although righting it
breaks little or no new constitutional ground. Justice Scalia has
mentioned previously that he does not lose sleep over capital
cases. However, some of us do lose sleep precisely because we
know Justice Scalia's sleep is untroubled. Kyles suggests that five
of the justice's colleagues also do not sleep well at certain times.
For the nation, that does not strike me as a bad thing.
In Garlotte v. Fordice,35 1 the Court held that a prisoner
challenging his conviction can meet the federal habeas corpus
statute's "custody" requirement 352 even if he has served the
sentence imposed for it as long as he is still serving other
sentences that run consecutively to the one is challenged.
Fordice pleaded guilty in state court to a marijuana offense and
two counts of murder. 353 The court sentenced him to three years
on the marijuana count and two life sentences on the murder
count, concurrent with each other but consecutive to the
marijuana sentence. 354 The court specified that the three-year
sentence would run first, to be followed by the concurrent life

350. Id. at 1560.
351. 115 S. Ct. 1948 (1995).
352. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
353. Garlotte, 115 S. Ct. at 1950.
354. Id.
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terms.355 Fordice challenged his marijuana conviction but by the
time he had exhausted his state remedies, he had already
commenced serving his life sentences.356 The Fifth Circuit held
that he was no longer in custody under the marijuana conviction
357
and thus could not attack it on federal habeas.
Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Ginsburg concluded that
Fordice was "in custody" for habeas purposes. 358 She began her
analysis by stating the rule in Peyton v. Rowe359 -- prisoners
incarcerated under consecutive state court sentences can apply for
federal habeas relief from sentences they have not yet begun to
serve, and that consecutive sentences should be treated as a
continuous series.360 She then observed that Fordice is "Peyton's
complement, or Peyton in reverse."' 36 1 She explained that the
case is similar to Peyton because the challenged conviction
adversely affects Fordice's release, and just as Peyton did not
"disaggregrate" the sentence, "we will not now adopt a different
construction simply because the sentence imposed under the
challenged conviction lies in the past rather than in the
future." 362
Justice Ginsburg noted also that at least one reason for making
no distinction is that state law would sometimes makes it difficult
"to determine when one sentence ends and a consecutive sentence
begins." ' 363 She noted further that the Court's ruling would not
encourage prisoners to delay filing petitions because of
procedural rules and prisoners' natural inclination to secure
release as soon as possible. 364

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

Id.
Id.
29 F.3d 216, 217 (1994).
Garlotte, 115 S. Ct. at 1952.
391 U.S. 54 (1968).
Garlotte, 115 S. Ct. at 1949.
Id.
Id. at 1952.
Id. at 1952 n.5.
Id.
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by

Chief
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Rehnquist,

dissented. 365 He argued that the practical consideration
underlying Peyton - the need to allow claims to be brought
before they grow stale - is not present in the reverse-Peyton
context. 366 He preferred the rule of Maleng v. Cook367 in which
the Court held that expired convictions may not be challenged on
habeas grounds. 3 6 8

As a practical matter, the impact of the ruling should not be
especially burdensome to the federal courts. And given the ever
narrowing category of available substantive relief on federal
habeas, the significance of the case dims further. However, the
case is noteworthy as yet another indication of the Court's
reluctance, with its newly minted centrist justices, to seize every
opportunity to reduce habeas access, as would Justice Thomas
and the Chief Justice.

VI. PLEA BARGAINING
Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal- Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(e)(6) prohibit the use at trial of statements made by
a defendant during plea negotiations. 369 In United States v.
Mezzanatto,3 7 0 the Court had to reconcile the strong policy
behind these rules with its own liberal waiver-inclined

365. Id.
366. Id. at 1953 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
367. 490 U.S. 488 (1989).
368. Id. Justice Ginsburg distinguished Maleng on the ground that it did not
involve consecutive sentences. Garlotte, 115 S. Ct. at 1952. In Maleng, the
petitioner was a federal prisoner who was yet to serve sentences imposed for
state convictions. 490 U.S. at 489. On habeas, he challenged a much earlier
conviction that had been used to enhance the state sentences he faced when
his federal term ended. Id. at 489-90. The Maleng Court held that the
potential use of a "fully expired" conviction to enhance a sentence for
subsequent offenses does not suffice to render a person "in custody" within
the meaning of the habeas statute. Id. at 493.
369. See FED. R. EvID. 410; FED. R. CmlM. PROC. 11(e)(6).
370. 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995).
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jurisprudence. By a 7-2 vote, with Justice Thomas writing for the
Court, the waiver jurisprudence prevailed.
Faced with various drug charges, Mezzanatto entered into plea
negotiations and acceded to the prosecution's insistence that any
statement he made during those negotiations could be used for
impeachment purposes if the case went to trial. 37 1 Dissatisfied
with the course of the negotiations, the government ended them,
but not before Mezzanatto admitted some involvement in the
crimes charged. 372 At trial, Mezzanatto testified and was
impeached with the statements he made during plea
negotiations.373
On appeal, Mezzanatto argued that the plea negotiation
statements were inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence
410 and Rule 11(e)(6) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Rule 410 provides that evidence of "any statement
made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the
prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty"' 374
are "not admissible against the defendant who ...

was a

participant in the plea discussions. "375 Rule 11 (e)(6) is virtually
identical. The Ninth Circuit agreed with Mezzanatto's argument,
holding that it would not "write in a waiver in a waiverless
rule.,, 376
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, held that the Ninth
Circuit's approach was at odds with the Supreme Court's waiver
371. Id. at 800.
372. Id.
373. Id.

374. FED. R. EvtD. 410.
375. Id.

376. United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1456 (9th Cir.), rev'd,
115 S. Ct. 797 (1995). In the circuit court, the government asserted that
since a defendant can waive certain constitutional rights, such as the right to
an appeal, then he "should be able to waive the right to exclude plea

negotiation statements." Id. at 1455-56. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that "[tlo
equate the waiver of these rules with that of an asserted constitutional

protection is a false equality. Judicially created waivers of the latter are the
result of the inescapable feature of the courts interpreting the Constitution by
defining the right asserted." Id. at 1456.
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jurisprudence as expressed "in the context of a broad array of
constitutional and statutory provisions." 377 Thomas emphasized
that waiver is generally permissible unless expressly prohibited.
This is especially so, he pointed out, in the context of evidentiary
rules, where waiver is a common and valuable part of everyday
trial practice. 378 Trading away the right to object to the
admission of evidence allows parties to obtain advantages that
would otherwise be unavailable. 379 To prevail here, Mezzanatto
would have to identify "some affirmative basis for concluding
that the plea statement rules depart from the presumption of
waivability." 3 80
Mezzanatto put forth three arguments: that the rules establish a
"guarantee to fair procedure" 381 that is unwaivable, that allowing
waiver will discourage defendants from entering into plea
discussions, and that allowing waiver permits prosecutorial
overreaching and abuse. 3 82 As to the first argument, Justice
Thomas conceded that some evidentiary provisions "may be so
fundamental to the fact-finding process that they may never be
waived," but the rule against admitting plea negotiation
statements is not one of them. 383 Here, he pointed out,
enforcement of the waiver enhanced the truth-seeking process.
Thomas also agreed that the purpose of the rules is to encourage
plea bargaining but he insisted that there is no basis in this case
for concluding that waiver will interfere with this goal; incentives
for prosecutors as well as defendants must be considered and
barring waivers might discourage prosecutors from plea-

377. Mezzatto, 115 S. Ct. at 801 (stating "a party may waive any
provision . . .of a statute intended for his benefit") (quoting Shute v.

Thompson, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 151 (1872)). See also Peretz v. United States,
501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) (holding "[t]he most basic rights of criminal
defendants are... subject to waiver").
378. Mezzanatto, 115 S.Ct. at 802.
379. Id.

380. Mezzatntto, 115 S.Ct. at 803.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 804-05.
383. Id. at 803.
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bargaining. 384 Agreeing also that there might be some potential
for abuse by allowing waiver, Thomas concluded that most
prosecutors can be trusted to follow the rules faithfully, and cases
385
of abuse can be handled individually.
It is important to note that while Justice Thomas' opinion
contains no express limitation on the use of plea negotiation
statements to impeach, three members of the seven-member
majority

-- Justices

Ginsburg,

O'Connor,

and Breyer --

emphasized in concurrence that the only issue in this case was the
admission of plea negotiation statements for impeachment, and
that the issue of whether such statements could be used by the
386
government in its case-in-chief was not before the Court.
Justice Souter dissented, joined by Justice Stevens. 387 He
argued that the majority's decision "is at odds with the intent of
Congress and will render the Rules largely dead letters." 3 88 As
he read the legislative history, the rules created more than just a
personal, waivable right. Rather, they are "meant to serve the
interest of the federal judicial system ...

by creating the

conditions understood by Congress to be effective in promoting
reasonable plea agreements ..."389

--

an interest that would not

be served by allowing waiver. He also believed that the almost
universal practice by which prosecutors extract waivers has
caused the "exception" to "swallow the rule.' 390
I find it difficult to decide whether the majority or the dissent is
correct. The dissent is strong on statutory construction, because
the policy behind the rules is very strong. On the other hand, if
one can waive virtually every constitutional right, it seems hard
to defend the proposition that a statutory right cannot also be
waived. Clearly, the decision strengthens the prosecution's hand
by providing it with a Damocletian sword to suspend over a
384.
385.
386.
387.

Id. at 804-05.
Id. at 806.
Id. at 806.
Id.

388. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
389. Id. at 808 (Souter, J., dissenting).

390. Id. at 808-09 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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defendant's head during the plea bargaining process. And it has
often been said that the true value of the sword of Damocles is
not that it falls, but that it hangs.
CONCLUSION

For a term which has engendered questions as to whether the
Court's "center" of a year ago has "held," the Court's criminal
law decisions do not contribute much to the debate. While
important in their own right, they were not blockbusters.
Although some decisions revealed a closely divided court, the
differences amongst the Justices were generally predictable in
that they were largely consistent with prior voting patterns.
Among the exceptions to predictability, I would list Justice
Breyer's votes, since it was his first year, and the slight
adjustment to the left by Justice O'Connor, especially in her
Vernonia dissent. The Warren Court's criminal law revolution
has been arrested for some time now. But for a few surprises,
such as the Court's recent hostility to criminal forfeiture, the
criminal law work of the Court for the past several years has
remained less than remarkable. This term was not significantly
different.
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